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E-Book Conspiracy: The Rule of Reason &
Department of Justice v. Apple & Price-Fixing
I. Introduction
In 2010, Apple was anticipating the launch of its new “iBook” store. With that launch,
Apple effectively entered into the e-book retail market.1 However, Apple entered an e-book
market dominated by its established competitors such as Barnes &Noble and Amazon. Apple
saw little chance of successfully competing with the pricing schemes of these competitors while
also generating a profit in the current e-book market.2 As a result, “Apple demanded, as a
precondition of its entry into the market, that it would not have to compete with Amazon on
price.”3
Though Apple was not established in either the e-book publishing market or the e-reader
manufacturing market, Apple was “one of America’s most admired, dynamic and successful
technology companies.”4 In order to convert its general technological market share advantage
into an e-reader and e-book market share advantage, Apple contacted the “Big Six” publishers
about setting up a pricing scheme for its e-book store that would allow it to evade the traditional
competition in the e-book market.5 The Big Six consisted of the six largest publishing firms in
the world. It consisted of Hachette, Macmillan, Penguin, HarperCollins, Simon & Schuster, and
Random House. Of those six publishing firms, only Random House refused to cooperate with
Apple’s scheme to artificially inflate e-book prices.6
Apple and five of the Big Six publishers developed a pricing scheme called the “Agency
Model.” Under this scheme, Apple became a nominal publishing agent. For every e-book that
Apple sold, the publishers received 70% and Apple received 30%.7 The five remaining
publishers agreed to this minimum resale price fixing, because they were afraid of Amazon’s
Page 1 of 30

AWR

Travis Jordan

burgeoning power within the e-book industry.8 Amazon regularly took a loss on bestselling ebooks by purchasing them from the publishers for $11.99 and subsequently selling them for
$9.99. At first, publishing profits soared.9 However, the major publishers began to resent
Amazon when Amazon started offering an e-book publishing scheme to any and all prospective
authors that was far more lucrative to those authors than a traditional print publishing contract.10
In supporting Apple’s Agency Model, the publishers hoped to diminish Amazon’s market share
in the e-book publishing and e-reader manufacturing market.11
Under the agreement between Apple and the major publishers, retail e-book prices were
set between $12.99 and $15.99.12 Apple also had a great deal of discretion in setting these prices
despite the notion of the Agency Model. Apple demanded and received the ability to set prices
for most of the e-book market; forbidding the publishers who contracted with Apple from
allowing any other e-book retailer to sell below the prices that Apple set. “Apple demanded, as a
precondition of its entry into the market, that it would not have to compete with Amazon on
price.”13 The publishers then had the leverage to demand that the Agency Model apply to all
other e-book retailers without the “Most Favored Nation” clause included in their contract with
Apple.14 Following the obvious and deliberate price-fixing agreement between Apple and the
major publishers, the Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against Apple and the publishers.15
The Department of Justice “alleges that the defendants conspired to raise, fix, and stabilize
the retail price for newly-released and bestselling trade e-books, to end retail price competition
among trade e-books retailers, and to limit retail price competition among the Publisher
Defendants in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.”16 The issue that arises in this
case and the issue central to this paper is whether the price fixing employed by Apple and the
major publishers to control the e-book market violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. As this paper
Page 2 of 30

AWR

Travis Jordan

and all relevant case law shows, it does.17 Apple and its co-defendants colluded to artificially
inflate prices in the e-book market in an attempt to undermine and diminish Amazon’s share of
that market.18 As a result, the cost to consumers purchasing e-books grew, publisher profits fell,
author earnings plummeted, and the overall retail e-book market grew more inefficient. Apple
was the only party who benefited.19

II. History of the Supreme Court’s Price Fixing Policy
A. The Sherman Antitrust Act and Per Se Illegality
The Sherman Antitrust Act was one of the first attempts by the legislature of the United
States to stop corporations and other such business ventures from engaging in anti-competitive
practices that harmed both trade and the consumers. The relevant section of the act is section 1,
and it states:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every
person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination
or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty
of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other
person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or
by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.20
As stated above, this act is generally considered to be overbroad. Over the next century, the
Supreme Court narrowed the offending instances considerably. The first case relevant to the
issue of minimum resale price fixing was Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. in
1911.21
The issue in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. was whether the Dr.
Miles Medical Company could force its retailers to sell its medical products at or above the
prices it established.22 Minimum retail price fixing was deemed per se illegal by the Supreme
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Court in the Dr. Miles case. This type of price fixing harmed both the consumers and the
retailers. Avoiding pricing schemes that harm the consumers was one of the main reasons the
Sherman Antitrust Act was established.23 The Court ruled, in essence, that minimum resale price
fixing was per se illegal.24 The Court’s ruling was that minimum retail price fixing was a policy
that only served to raise prices unnecessarily for consumers.25 The Court decided that such a
policy could not coexist with the Sherman Antitrust Act. The per se illegality of minimum retail
price fixing established in Dr. Miles remained the law for almost a century.

B. The Supreme Court Overrules Dr. Miles on Maximum Price Fixing in Khan.
In 1997, the Supreme Court extended the Rule of Reason’s power and applicability in its
judgment of State Oil Co. v. Khan.26 In Khan, the antitrust issue before the Court was whether
maximum resale price fixing fit within the framework of the Sherman Antitrust Act or whether it
was per se illegal.27 For decades, the Court upheld its judgment in Dr. Miles that established a
per se condemnation of price fixing.28 The Court’s decision received a great deal of criticism
when it upheld the per se invalidation of all maximum price restraints in Albrecht.29 The Court’s
decision in Albrecht, it was this reaction to its opinion in Albrecht that forced the Court to
reassess the issue, because the Court acknowledged the “substantial criticism the
decision…received,” and in Khan, the Court finally decided that there was “insufficient
economic justification for per se invalidation of vertical maximum price fixing.”30 As a result,
the Court judged that “vertical maximum price fixing, like the majority of commercial
arrangements subject to the antitrust laws, should be evaluated under the Rule of Reason.”31
The Court’s judgment in Khan was another step away from the Court’s original and
universal condemnation of all trade restraints established in Dr. Miles.32 The Sherman Antitrust
Act was established by Congress to protect America’s citizens and markets from predatory
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business practices.33 Congress appointed the Court the sole party able to determine what business
practices did or did not violate the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Over the course of the century following its Dr. Miles opinion, the Court’s opinions
constantly altered which restraints on trade were truly injurious.34 The Court’s shifting
interpretation of trade restraints was a result of constantly evolving economic theorems. As
economists shifted the definition of practices that stimulated the economy and practices that
harmed and depressed it, the Court altered its judgments to keep pace with the constantly shifting
economic landscape. The Court asserted that “recognizing and adapting to changed
circumstances and the lessons of accumulated experience,” within the economic realm, was part
of its duty.35 The Court’s opinion in Khan was partly a reaction to the evolving economic
markets.
In its Khan opinion, the Court discussed the possible procompetitive effects of maximum
price fixing.36 The Court mostly referenced the economic criticisms of Albrecht.37 In expanding
its interpretation of the Rule of Reason, the Court managed to remove and convert a portion of
the Rule of Reason’s detractors. However, this expansion prompted the evolution of antitrust law
that resulted in the Court’s eventual Leegin opinion.

C. The Supreme Court Overrules Dr. Miles on Minimum Price Fixing in
Leegin.
In 2007, the United States Supreme Court overruled its Dr. Miles decision in Leegin
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. (2007). After 96 years of applying per se illegality
to minimum resale price fixing cases, the Supreme Court decided to overrule its Dr. Miles
decision.38 In its Leegin opinion, the Court established the Rule of Reason as the proper standard
applicable to minimum resale price fixing, whether or not there was a violation of section 1 of
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the Sherman Antitrust Act.39 “Under this rule, the fact finder weighs all of the circumstances of a
case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable
restraint on competition.”40 The Supreme Court went on to enumerate many of the factors
integral to the outcome of its Rule of Reason test.
The Court established many factors to consider within the umbrella of the Rule of Reason
test, but it also implied that its enumerated factors were neither complete nor exhaustive. One of
the factors it considered was “specific information about the relevant business and the restraint’s
history, nature, and effect.”41 The Court’s opinion involved examining the relative industry, how
the restraint arose, why the restraint arose, what it was supposed to accomplish, and what it
actually achieved. Another aspect of the Rule of Reason the Court enumerated was “whether the
businesses involved have market power.”42 Corporations, ventures, and trusts would be more
likely to violate the Rule of Reason if those price fixing entities had the necessary power and
influence to harm competing entities in the relevant market or to harm the customers of those
other businesses and concerns while exerting a monopolistic-type power.
Further, the Rule of Reason analyzed the relationship between market power, market
structure, and the free trade restraint’s actual effect on the market.43 This is similar to the aspects
of the Rule of Reason enumerated above, but it looked less at the initial motivation and more at
the effects of the initiated restraint on free trade had on the overall market. An attempt to suborn
a certain market, having a sinister motive that barely affected the market and free trade, was less
damning under the Rule of Reason test than the effect an innocent motive that undermined and
harmed consumers.44
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With its implementation of the Rule of Reason, the Court essentially backed away from a

per se condemnation of minimum resale price fixing. It argued that some of these price fixing
restraints could have stimulating effects on a market and could serve to benefit consumers and
therefore the general public.45 The Court wanted to limit its condemnation to those restraints that
had already negatively and actually affected a certain market; or at least those that were almost
certainly going to produce a negative effect in the future. Further, the Court chose to proscribe
anticompetitive practices that harmed the consuming public more harshly than it proscribed those
that harmed business interests.46 The Supreme Court focused on three main criteria in its
application of the Rule of Reason.
In each of its analyses, the Court first focused on the intent of the trade-restraining party
and whether a conspiracy of collusion existed. Next, the Court looked at the harm caused by the
suspect to the relevant market or industry. Lastly, the Court determined whether or not the
relevant and alleged restraint actually caused harm to the consumer. Of these three aspects, the
Supreme Court found restraints that harmed the consuming public to be the most insidious. After
all, the Sherman Antitrust Act’s main goal was the “protection of competition, not
competitors.”47

III. Evolution of the Supreme Court’s Application of the Sherman
Antitrust Act to Trade Restraints.
A. Per Se Illegality Applied to All Restraints
The Sherman Antitrust Act was enacted by Congress in 1890. The act banned “every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce.”48 For the first few years of the act’s existence, the Court interpreted the statute
literally. The Court invalidated “every contract…in restraint of trade.”49 The Court did not care if
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the restraint was harmful or even helpful to the market. Many legal scholars argued for a more
discerning test to apply to market restraints.50 From the Sherman Act’s conception, dissenting
justices of the Court wrote opinions arguing for a legal standard that only condemned a
defendant if the “restraint which it produces be unreasonable.”51
The Court first limited the overly broad scope of the Sherman Antitrust Act in Standard
Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States.52 The Court decided this case in 1911, and this was the first time
the Court’s application of the Sherman Antitrust Act went beyond the simple identification of
any and all market restraints. Given that the Court limited its condemnation to only those market
restraints that were unreasonable, the rule and method the Court used to analyze market restraints
and apply the Sherman Antitrust Act became the Rule of Reason.53 However, the Court did not
utilize the Rule of Reason as the objective, analytical tool it is today until the Court’s Chicago
Board of Trade opinion in 1918.54

B. Development of the Rule of Reason as Alternative to Per Se Illegality
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Chicago Board of Trade marked the beginning of an
important shift in how the Court applied the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Rule of Reason was
formally adopted by the Court during its analysis of this case.55 The Court’s adoption of the Rule
of Reason caused a divergence in its methods of analyses. While the Court continued to apply a
standard of per se illegality to certain types of market restraints, such as maximum and minimum
resale price fixing, it began to apply its newly developed Rule of Reason test to all market
restraints not covered by specifically enumerated per se illegality rules.
Over the course of the 20th century, the Supreme Court applied its Rule of Reason test to
an ever increasing number and variety of cases. As the Court’s application of the Rule of Reason
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to market restraints expanded, its application of per se illegality to market restraints contracted
proportionally. Over the following years, the Court’s application of the Sherman Antitrust Act
inexorably moved towards a broader application of the Rule of Reason to a greater variety of
market restraints.
The more inherently harmful the Supreme Court found a certain kind of market restraint,
the longer it took for the Court to acknowledge that said market restraint could possibly be
reasonable and therefore eligible for analysis under the Rule of Reason. For example, the Court
found price fixing of any type particularly harmful.56 The Court continued to consider all types
of vertical price fixing per se illegal for over 100 years after it first started applying the Sherman
Antitrust Act to restraints on the market. The Court first changed its stance on vertical price
fixing in 1997.57

C. Proliferation of the Rule of Reason in the Analysis of Market Restraints
“Vertical maximum price fixing like the majority of commercial arrangements subject to
the antitrust laws, should be evaluated under the Rule of Reason.”58 State Oil v. Khan was the
Supreme Court’s first application of its Rule of Reason to any type of vertical price fixing. The
type of price fixing in this case was maximum vertical price fixing. The Supreme Court’s
decades-long reluctance to apply the Rule of Reason to vertical price fixing was demonstration
of the serious and anti-competitive nature of vertical price fixing. And even though the Court
decided in 1997 that maximum vertical price fixing was not always inherently anticompetitive
and unreasonable, the Court’s view of minimum resale price fixing had not changed up to that
point.
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The Department of Justice accused Apple of instituting an unreasonable restraint on trade

in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. One of the foremost issues in the case was minimum
resale price fixing.59 Throughout the history of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Court treated few
market restraints as harshly as it did minimum resale price fixing. For 117 years, the Court ruled
that all types of minimum resale price fixing were per se illegal. This changed in 2007.60 Leegin
was a landmark case decided by the Court in 2007. Far from legalizing this particular type of
vertical price fixing, the Supreme Court’s ruling merely allowed for the possibility that this price
fixing was not always, in every single instance, per se illegal.61
It was no coincidence that Apple enacted its price fixing scheme so soon after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Leegin. If it had launched its Agency Model just a few short years
earlier, the Court would have found this Agency Model to be per se illegal. Apple saw a shift in
the law, and it took advantage of this new ambiguity in antitrust law. Apple’s plan worked
economically, because at the very least, its new Agency Model had to be analyzed by the Rule of
Reason in court.62

IV. The Sherman Antitrust Act & Apple’s Agency Model.
A. Overview of Apple’s Agency Model.
Apple and its publisher co-conspirators created the Agency Model to use as an economic
and contractual tool. Apple and its publishing partners used the Agency Model to raise the retail
price of e-books across the entire market.63 Apple could not afford to match the e-book pricing of
its competitors while maintaining a competitive profit margin.64 Because of their established
market share, Amazon’s “Kindle” and Barnes & Noble’s “Nook” were able to offer steadily
diminishing e-book prices paralleling the increasing volume of their e-book sales. Instead of
pricing competitively, Apple utilized the publishers’ fear that lowering e-book prices would
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AWR

Travis Jordan

cause the public to devalue physical, paper books. Apple also had a bargaining advantage,
because they were such a large distributor of audiobooks. Further, Apple’s contract with its
publishing partners had a clause giving Apple unilateral control in pricing e-books for its
competitors as well.65
One of the most pernicious aspects of Apple’s Agency Model deal was the amount of
collusion between the major publishers and Apple.66 There were numerous secret meetings
between the publishers and Apple, and there were a plethora of incriminating e-mails sent
between the colluding parties. The publishers were already desperately searching for a way to
stall the growth of the e-book, so they could prolong the life of the paper book. Further, the
publishers were already looking for a way to injure Apple’s largest competitor in the e-reader
and e-book market.67 The major publishers were frightened of Amazon’s new efficient e-book
publishing service for unsigned and independent writers. Given the low overhead on e-books,
Amazon was able to offer relatively high royalty rates to a vast ocean of unknown writers. Some
new writers were even able to utilize the e-book publishing on Amazon to make six figure
royalties within the span of a few weeks.68 The publishers were afraid their antiquated and
inefficient publishing policies utilizing popular writers to subsidize unpopular and unknown
writers would not be able to survive this new medium.
Apple also leveraged the addition of a clause in the agreement preventing contracted
publishers from allowing other e-book retailers, with whom they were contracted, to sell the
contracted publishers’ e-books for a lesser resale price than Apple either could or would sell.69
As a result, the five major publishers made this agency agreement a mandatory part of all
contracts with other e-book retailers to whom they were contracted. With all of these new
contracts, Apple became competitive in the e-book market by causing e-book resale prices
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throughout the market to initially inflate and subsequently stagnate.70 Further, and even more
suspiciously, Apple’s agency deal with the publishers contained a Most Favored Nation
(“MFN”) clause that essentially violated the entire idea of the agency deal.71 It stopped the
publishers from setting prices outside of a very small range of $12.99 to $14.99 and $15.99.
Even within these ranges, Apple was often able to set the prices.72 And once Apple set the prices,
the publishers could then no longer allow Apple’s competitors to sell for less than Apple. “The
MFN protected Apple from retail price competition as it punished a Publisher if it failed to
impose agency terms on other e-tailers.”73 All of these different facets of the agency model
agreement established between Apple and its e-book suppliers showed that the agreement existed
more to hurt Amazon and other competitors than to help the publishers.

B. Vertical Price-Fixing Liability Applied to Apple’s Agency Model.
Firstly, the Supreme Court’s Rule of Reason test analyzed “specific information about the
relevant business” and the “restraint’s history, nature, and effect.” 74 The industry involved in
this case was e-book wholesale (licensing) sales and retail (sublicensing) sales. Within this
industry, e-book retailers licensed e-books from major publishers, often for around $11.99 for
new releases. After they licensed the e-books, the retailers were allowed to sell (sublicense) the
e-books for whatever price they chose. 75
Amazon often sold its new release e-books for $9.99, which was a loss. It sold them at a
loss, because it wished to build brand loyalty among the consumers of its e-books.76 Until 2007
and Leegin, setting a minimum resale (sublicense) price as a wholesaler, was per se illegal.77
Next, the Court analyzed the “restraint’s history, nature, and effect” within the e-book
market.78 Apple’s iBook store was not launched until 2010, and this Agency Model restraint on
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trade did not exist until those major publishers and Apple negotiated the contract relevant to the
iBook store. This part of the analysis went poorly for Apple and the big five. The e-book market
existed for nearly a decade before the agency model was first introduced, and the market was
healthy and growing.79 The e-book retailers were making a sizable and growing profit, and the
publishers’ profit margin on the e-books was equivalent to their corporeal book profit. The
Agency Model’s restrictive effect on resale pricing options caused a rise in the price of e-books
and, it prohibited e-book retailers from being able to establish resale prices of their own. The
effect was a quick and artificial inflation of e-book retail prices.80 The publishers wished this
inflation to boost their profit margin per unit.81 However, the unforeseen effect was to lower the
gross profits made by both themselves and their authors.82 The consumers were unhappy with the
raised prices, so they chose to buy fewer e-books.
Whether the “businesses involved have market power is a further, significant
consideration”83 the Court considered in its analysis. The publishers involved in this case were
five of the six largest book publishers in the world, and Apple was “one of America’s most
admired, dynamic and successful technology companies.”84 Further, while Apple did not have a
very large market share in e-book sales at the time of the establishment of the Agency Model
contract, Apple was technically a very large seller of e-book readers with its iPhone and iPod
lines.85 The fact that these major corporations colluded to inflate retail prices by forcing
minimum resale prices on every other market participant was damning.86 The sheer, economic
power of the colluding parties in this case may even have been in violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, which states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
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States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
$100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000,
or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.87
Also relevant to the Court’s application of the Rule of Reason was “an inquiry into

market power and market structure designed to assess [a restraint's] actual effect.”88 The Court
analyzed the market structure prior to the restraint and Apple’s entrance into the e-book market.
From the introduction of the e-book until 2010, the market consisted of e-book
licensors/wholesalers selling e-books to the sub-licensors/retailers for whatever price the market
would bear. After that, the sub-licensors/retailers would sell the e-books to consumers for
whatever price best fit their business strategies.89 The retailers could raise the price, they could
lower the price, and they had full control of the product’s resale/sub-license price after they
bought/licensed it. “This wholesale model was more profitable for a Publisher’s e-book business
than the agency model proposed by Apple.”90
After Apple’s Agency Model contract with the five major publishers in 2010, the whole
structure of the e-book market changed. Six of the most powerful entities within the e-book
market forced the Agency Model on all of the e-book sellers under threat of a complete cessation
of business.91 This forceful manipulation reeked of impropriety. Apple and its co-conspirators
seemed to fail this aspect of the Rule of Reason test.
A last and overarching catchall within the Rule of Reason, as outlined in Leegin, was
whether the effect of the restraint at issue was anticompetitive and harmful to the consumer, or
whether the restraint stimulated competition and was beneficial to the consumer.92 Did the
restraint help or harm the average consumer? Before the Agency Model was implemented, many
e-book companies such as Barnes and Noble sold e-books for the same price they paid for said ePage 14 of 30
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book. Amazon even sold most bestsellers for a loss. Amazon’s aim was to lure consumers into
buying other e-books while on its site. Basically, the overall effect of the Agency Model on the
consumer was an increase in retail e-book prices across the board.93 To protect Apple’s profit
margin, the contracting publishers forced all other e-book retailers to sell for up to 50% higher
prices. This market restraint would definitely fail the Rule of Reason test. The consuming public
lost in this scenario. The Sherman Antitrust Act was created to help the public and market
competition. This restraint harmed them.
In summation, all of the factors the Supreme Court enumerated in its opinions when
analyzing the Rule of Reason added up to whether or not the specific restraint violated three
different aspects of the subject market and its participants.94 The first was whether the parties
colluded and intended to harm the market participants. Apple and the publishers colluded with
the intent to harm Amazon in particular as well as other lesser participants in the market. The
second is whether their restraint on free trade harmed the industry or market.95 This restraint
caused a diminution to all of the publishers’ sales and profits.96 And it also resulted in lowered
sales and profits for the e-book retailers. Lastly, this Agency Model resulted in artificially
inflated prices for the consumer.97 The only participant in the market that was not harmed by this
restraint was Apple. Despite minimum price fixing no longer being per se illegal, this Agency
Model still failed the Rule of Reason test.

C. Horizontal Price-Fixing Liability Applied to Apple’s Agency Model.
The Supreme Court still applies the per se illegality standard to the horizontal price fixing
restraint. Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, it was a more heinous offense, because it involved
collusion between similarly situated parties that should have competed with one another within a
certain market.98 Horizontal price fixing involves an agreement between horizontally situated
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parties, those who should be competitors, in an attempt to defraud the consuming public. The
Court has continued to apply the per se illegality standard to horizontal price fixing, because
horizontal price fixing is a market restraint that cannot possibly have procompetitive effects.99
And even if Apple and its publishing partners did not violate the Rule of Reason with their
vertical price fixing, they still colluded in an effort to establish a horizontal price fixing
conspiracy between the contracting publishers and Apple.100
Apple’s Agency Model, as described above, included more than just an agreement not to
sell e-books under a certain price. Apple’s Agency Model agreement with its publishing partners
also included clauses that prohibited the publishers from allowing any of Apple’s competitors to
sell for a lower price than Apple.101 This was the most basic definition of horizontal price
fixing.102 Apple conspired and colluded with the participating publishers to stop any e-book
seller from pricing below a certain point. And even if Apple passed all of the Rule of Reason’s
requirements, as enumerated by the Court, they could not deny the horizontal price-fixing nature
of Apple’s conspiratorial plotting with the publishers that resulted in the Agency Model
contracts. The success of the conspiracy depended on Apple’s participation.103
Apple and its publishing partners admitted that there was no universal economic
incentive to fix prices on e-books across all competitive e-book retailers. The publishers were
chasing the unlikely goal of bolstering the abstract value of a corporeal book.104 Apple
manipulated the publishers’ fears that print publishing would eventually evolve into an industry
that primarily sold e-books. Apple utilized these fears to build an Agency Model contract with
the publishers, with a necessary reciprocity that ultimately forced a unilateral and uniform
pricing scheme across the entire e-book industry.105
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Apple’s Agency Model arrangement with its publishing partners started as mere vertical

minimum resale price fixing, subject to the Rule of Reason. But Apple leveraged its market
power and the publishers’ fears of its competitors to create a horizontal price fixing stratagem
that was per se illegal under the Sherman Antitrust Act.106 Even if Apple managed to have its
vertical market restraint proved reasonable, it would still fail. There has never been a legally
reasonable horizontal price fixing restraint, as a result, Apple’s horizontal conspiracy constituted
“a per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.”107 The Department of Justice would eventually
find Apple in violation of multiple aspects of Sherman Antitrust Act.

V. The Department of Justice v. Apple Judgment on the Agency
Model & Conspiracy
A. Overview of the Case
On July 10, 2013 the court in Department of Justice v. Apple held that Apple’s Agency
Model agreement with the defendant publishers violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.108 At the
time of the court’s decision, Apple was the only defendant that remained in the case. The
publishers that contracted with Apple settled out of court.109 The court held that Apple engaged
in both horizontal and vertical price-fixing conspiracies.110 In its opinion, the court first
addressed the issue of whether Apple engaged in a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy.
Creating a restraint on trade by horizontal price-fixing was per se unlawful;
therefore the court’s analysis was not especially involved. However, the court used some creative
logic to find Apple part of a horizontal conspiracy.111 It was creative, because Apple was not
horizontally aligned with the other conspirators. The Court ruled that Apple was the
conspiratorial hub connecting the horizontally aligned publishers. After its first analysis, the
court found that Apple engaged in vertical price fixing as well. Even under the application of this
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more lenient Rule of Reason, the court found that Apple had engaged in a price-fixing
conspiracy.112

B. Horizontal Price-Fixing
The standard of liability for horizontal price-fixing is per se. As such, the court in U.S. v.
Apple determined only whether Apple engaged in a conspiracy to restrain trade. However, the
court also had to determine whether the conspiracy took place amongst interests situated
horizontally similarly.113 This was an odd course for the court to take, because Apple was a great
deal more vertically related to the book publishers with which it conspired.
While the publishers could have been said to be in a horizontal conspiracy as horizontal
competitors, it was not clear how the court could show that Apple had participated in such a
conspiracy. However, the court judged that Apple was an integral and necessary part of the
conspiracy to price fix amongst the publishers. Apple was the catalyst in this conspiracy, and the
court decided the conspiracy would not have existed without Apple.114 “Understanding that no
one Publisher could risk acting alone in an attempt to take pricing power away from Amazon,
Apple created a mechanism and environment that enabled them to act together in a matter of
weeks to eliminate all retail price competition for their e-books.”115 Apple organized, with the
publishers, what the publishers had been unable to organize with one another.
“To establish a conspiracy…proof of joint or concerted action is required.”116 To
elaborate, “circumstances must reveal a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding,
or a meeting of minds in an unlawful agreement.”117 Apple argued that there was no meeting of
minds. It argued that all of the conspirators reached similar but independent conclusions. Apple’s
defense was that there could be no “conspiracy by telepathy.”118 The court did not accept or
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validate Apple’s claim of independent creation. The court already knew that “every Publisher
with whom Apple met lamented Amazon’s pricing New Releases and NYT Bestsellers at $9.99.
Several of them made clear that they were actively searching for a way to gain more control over
pricing and were implementing tactics they did not enjoy.”119
The evidence showed that there had been cooperation, unity of purpose, and
correspondence in furtherance of Apple’s conspiracy. Steve Jobs, Apple’s CEO at the time, was
the source of a great deal of this evidence. Jobs told James Murdoch that he understood the
Publishers’ concerns that “Amazon’s $9.99 price for new releases is eroding the value perception
of their products . . . and they do not want this practice to continue.”120 He offered to help raise
the prices, and he even told one reporter “that Amazon’s $9.99 price for the same book would be
irrelevant because soon all prices will ‘be the same.’”121 The court found this last statement
especially damning.
Further, “calls among the Publisher Defendants’ CEOs would continue and intensify at
critical moments during the course of the Publishers’ ensuing negotiations with Apple.”122 Many
times, Apple would reassure each publisher “that it was not interested in entering the e-book
market by pursuing a low-price strategy. Apple opined that $9.99 was not yet “engrained” in the
consumer mind, and suggested in each meeting that e-books should be priced between $11.99
and $14.99.”123 Apple and the publishers conspired with one another to inflate the prices of ebooks many times over the course of contract negotiations.
The court determined that there was a unity of purpose and a meeting of the minds. The
months before the iPad launched, Apple and the publishers communicated constantly with one
another.124 The goal of the conspirators was to raise the retail prices of e-books. Further, every
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party involved wanted Amazon to lose its e-book market share. The publishers and Apple all
desired the same objective and the publishers were even willing to forego additional profits, at
least in the short term, to obtain this objective.125
Though Apple was not horizontally positioned near the publishers, the court found it had
committed horizontal price fixing.126 Apple’s position within the conspiracy was the most
important aspect of this analysis. Apple negotiated, initiated, and united the conspiracy. It was
the conspiracy’s impetus, and the conspiracy could not have existed had Apple not actively
sought and united the other conspiratorial parties for this purpose.127 The publishers had been
trying to accomplish something similar for years, and it never happened until Apple joined the
conspiracy.128

C. Vertical Price-Fixing
Next, the court looked at whether Apple had been engaged in a vertical minimum resale
price-fixing conspiracy. This analysis was not necessary, but given vertical price-fixing’s more
lenient standard of analysis, the court wished to show that Apple would still be in violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act under the Rule of Reason.129 Unlike horizontal price-fixing, vertical
price-fixing is analyzed under the Rule of Reason.
For Apple to have violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, the restraint of trade caused by its
conspiracy had to have been unreasonable and not cancelled out by procompetitive effects. The
restraint must be actual and adverse as well, because “the plaintiffs bear an initial burden to
demonstrate the defendants’ challenged behavior had an actual adverse effect on competition as
a whole in the relevant market.”130
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Apple argued that its conspiracy with the publisher was procompetitive, because it

lowered Amazon’s market share in the e-book market.131 But the court was not addressing such
competitiveness. The court reminded Apple that the Sherman Antitrust Act is about “the
protection of competition, not competitors.”132 The court ruled that Apple had one main goal in
fixing the price. It opined that Apple simply “did not want to compete with Amazon (or any
other e-book retailer) on price.”133
The court went on to point out that there were few clauses more anticompetitive than the
Most Favored Nation clause Apple inserted into its contract with each publisher. The primary
effect of the MFN “protected Apple by guaranteeing it could match the lowest retail price listed
on any competitor’s e-bookstore.”134 However, the MFN clause went far beyond that. The court
further condemned the MFN, because it “imposed a severe financial penalty upon the Publisher
Defendants if they did not force Amazon and other retailers similarly to change their business
models and cede control over e-book pricing to the Publishers.”135
Apple tried to argue that a MFN clause was something common that it often included in
contracts. The court pointed out that the MFN clause used here was unique. “Apple had used an
MFN in one of its music agreements, but the music had been purchased under a wholesale
model. Apple’s use of an MFN for a retail price was a unique feature of its e-book agency
agreements.”136 This MFN clause was simply too powerful and overreaching.
The Agency Model theoretically gave pricing discretion to the publishers; however, the
MFN clause simply took this discretion for Apple. Publishers could set prices in Apple’s e-book
store. However, Apple could simply change the prices back “unless the Publishers moved all of
their e-tailers to an agency model and raised e-book prices in all of those e-bookstores, Apple
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would be selling its e-books at its competitors’ lower prices.”137 The agency agreement was
supposed to inflate the values of books, but it actually just “eliminated any risk that Apple would
ever have to compete on price when selling e-books, while as a practical matter forcing the
Publishers to adopt the Agency Model across the board.”138
The court ruled that Apple failed even the much more lenient Rule of Reason analysis.139
There was simply too much evidence of a conspiracy. There were e-mails, phone calls, and trips.
Cue, an Apple executive, even testified that “his last trip was unprecedented in length -- it lasted
nine days -- and as Cue described, for that entire period, if he was not eating or sleeping, he was
negotiating.”140 There was much more than incidental contact between parties, and the court
judged that the parties definitely did not independently arrive at the same prices.141

VI. The Effect of Leegin on Minimum Resale Price Fixing in Other
Markets
A. Overview
Apple was not the first company to use the agency model in an attempt to get around the
price fixing laws established by the Sherman Antitrust Act. With Leegin in 2007, the Supreme
Court abolished the per se illegality of minimum retail price fixing established in Dr. Miles a
century before.142 It was no coincidence that the major issue in U.S. v. Apple first appeared in
2011, only a few years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Leegin. With the establishment of
the Rule of Reason as the new standard of analysis in minimum price fixing cases, many
corporations tried to take advantage of price fixing. Wholesalers tried to unilaterally force their
wills on retailers and on consumers.
Offending corporations were then able to spend years in court defending their business
models while violating aspects of the Sherman Antitrust Act. There was no reason not to
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implement minimum resale price fixing. Even markets such as big box retail and online music
were incorporating minimum resale price fixing. Under this new, more lenient standard of
analysis, wholesale corporations began to fix resale prices more often.
It became poor business not to push against this area of the law. The new, fashionable
argument became that agency models made the market more “efficient.” The establishment of an
efficient market was the main reason that the Court instituted the Rule of Reason and its vaguer
standard to replace per se illegality.143

B. Omega v. Costco: Big Box Price Fixing.
In Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., Omega manufactured a copyrighted watch
that it never marketed in America.144 It had an agency agreement similar to Apple’s with certain
retailers in Europe. Costco bought many of these watches from a third party for the purpose of
resale.145 Costco sold these watches in its store for $1200, while Omega’s agency agreement with
its contracted retailers in Europe required a $2000 resale price.146
Costco entered into no such contractual agreement with Omega. Costco bought its
Omega watches on the grey market and brought them to America.147 This case started out as an
issue of agency agreement versus the first sale doctrine in a way similar to the Apple case, but it
morphed into something very different. Omega asserted copyright and trademark reasoning to
get around the first sale doctrine.148 Omega did not use an agency agreement. They utilized
copyright and trademark reasoning to get around the Sherman Antitrust Act. Omega won149 at
the Appeals level. As a result, manufacturers and wholesalers acted more and more boldly in
their attempts to evade certain aspects of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Costco applied to the
Supreme Court for certiorari.
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Corporations who wished to utilize maximum and minimum vertical price fixing saw a

way to utilize intellectual property concepts to muddle and confuse the antitrust issues. In the
Omega case, it was ultimately trademark law that benefited Omega.150 In a Post-Leegin world,
corporations became more and more creative in their attempts to skirt laws against market
restraints such as the Sherman Antitrust Act. This was most apparent in the electronics market as
corporations attempted to argue that software and electronic media were exempt from vertical
restraint laws. This was a major issue in the cases involving online music.

C. Starr v. Sony: Price Fixing in Online Music
Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment is an ongoing case about alleged collusion
amongst various music publishers to fix internet music prices.151 The plaintiffs were consumers
of online music, and they claimed that these publishers violated the Sherman Antitrust Act in
conspiring to fix the prices of online music.152 The plaintiffs cited how the price of online music
had stayed the same throughout the history of the market’s existence despite the fact that
production costs had gone down.153 The plaintiffs used ongoing investigations of the music
companies for conspiracy and collusion by the New York Attorney General and the Department
of Justice to show the presence of a conspiracy’s symptoms and the need for discovery to find
evidence of the conspiracy.154
The plaintiffs in this case utilized the uncanny lockstep pricing in the online music
industry to show that there was evidence of anti-competitive practices occurring.155 The
appearance of a complete lack of competition in the online music industry, amongst all of the
major publishers, showed at least one element of a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. The effects of a possible conspiracy were apparent but the origin was hidden.
Apple would have argued that there can be no “conspiracy by telepathy.”156 The plaintiffs in this
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case scored a big win for consumers against price fixing when they proved their right to enter
discovery and continue the case.157
The Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of licensing and whether it fits within the
umbrella of vertical price fixing before. The Court’s opinion in United States v. Paramount held
licensed films to the same Sherman Antitrust standards as more corporeal forms of property.158
The issue of whether the First Sale Doctrine applied to online music and e-books was not as new
an issue as it at first seemed. Online music price collusion was especially similar to the
Paramount decision.159 Both involved allegations of vertical and horizontal price fixing. Unlike
with minimum resale price fixing, the Rule of Reason was never adopted by the Court for
horizontal price fixing.

VII. Conclusion
In conclusion, Apple and its five major publishing cohorts violated Section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act with their Agency Model method of restricting free trade for e-book
retailers. Apple tried to disguise the agreement’s nature by alleging that it was the “agent” for the
publishing companies. This relationship did not truly exist. The contract existed solely to raise ebook prices throughout the market to allow Apple to compete in a new market while establishing
the prices and the profit margins it desired.160 Further, Apple conspired with the publishers to
harm Amazon’s e-book sales with this agency method. However, the parties most harmed by
Apple’s conspiracy were the authors whose profits saw a large decline and the consumers who
were forced to pay vastly inflated prices.161
Apple’s Agency Model scheme was definitely in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Provision, and it may have been in violation of section 2, covering monopolies as well.
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Lastly, while Apple and five of the Big Six book publishers failed in their attempt to establish
minimum resale price restraints, more and more companies are succeeding in varied and diverse
markets where their predecessors failed.
If the Department of Justice convicted Apple of nothing else, it could still convict Apple
of horizontal price fixing. It is still per se illegal, and Apple was an integral component in the
collusion to horizontally fix all e-book prices in the market.162 Apple tried to force a new
industry standard into its publishing contract that ultimately required its competitors to utilize
this same standard. If the Department of Justice had allowed Apple’s agreement with the
publishers to stand, there would no longer have been any competition within the e-book retail
market, because all of the major publishers would be forced to sell or license their products for
the same price to retailers or risk taking huge losses. The retailers would then be forced to sell or
sub-license their products for fixed prices. The consumers would be left with no options within
the market. Apple’s conspiracy had to be struck down, or there would be no competition between
any e-book retailers, and the consumers would suffer the most.163
For all of the conclusions stated above, the court invalidated Apple’s Agency Model
agreement.164 The price-fixing was too obvious, and it was beneficial only to Apple. In some
cases, the publishers’ profits dropped 50% or more on a given e-book. Further, sales volumes
also dropped under this new system. The publishers were so obsessed with getting rid of the
threat they knew, they could not see the larger threat of Apple. As a result, Apple was able to
extract some extreme concessions that resulted in both vertical and horizontal price-fixing.165
The conspiracy hurt the consumer, promised short term losses for the publishers, and only had an
ephemeral chance of being beneficial for the publishers in the long term.166
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